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THE BATTLE OF THE STANDARDS
EDWARD W. SPENCER
S INCE the historic Battle of the Standard, that wild clash of arms
upon the bloody field of England eight centuries ago, many ver-
itable battles of the standards have been fought out in the courts of the
civilized world, not by men in armor, but by men in wig and gown and
learned in the law, often with the aid of those whose special knowledge,
training and experience qualify them to speak ex cathedra as to the
authenticity or authorship of writings where that question was in issue
or relevant thereto. For years under the English common law this bat-
tle involved a struggle as to whether, the authorship of any particular
writing being in issue, its genuineness or otherwise could be determined
by the comparison of such writing with any proved genuine hand-
writing of the alleged author of the writing in dispute as an exemplar
or standard of comparison and judgment by the tryers of fact, with
or without the aid of experts, or whether such comparison must be
confined to such writings as were already properly in the case as
genuine for some other purpose. The present writer discussed this
conflict generally in an article in this REViEW in 1917' and again in
one of its special and rather peculiar phases in 1929.2 Little attempt
will here be made to invade again or to re-survey these particular
fields of legal strife save incidentally. In short, the "battle for the
See Spencer, Spurious and Questioned Documents (1917) 1 MARQ. L. REv.
114; 11 R. C. L. 625.
2 See Spencer, Use of Extraneous or Unproved Writings in Cross-Examination
in Questioned Document Cases, with some digressions (1929) 13 MARQ. L.
REv. 129.
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standards" has, generally speaking, been won. The law of practically
all our states, by judicial decision in a few of them,3 and by statutes
in others, as in England and Canada,4 permits now the comparison of
a questioned or disputed writing with any proved or admittedly gen-
uine writing of the person whose writing is in question as a measure
or standard of their genuineness or authorship of the questioned writing.
That is true whether such genuine writings are already in the case
for some other purpose than comparison, or whether they are wholly
extrinsic to the record proper being brought in that they may be used
only as standards of comparison with the questioned writing. Thus
under the law as it now quite generally exists questioned document
cases frequently become veritable battles of the standards, or battles
between conceded or proved genuine writings on either side, as a basis
of comparison and judgment not only as to the genuiness of the
questioned writing, but otherwise as to its particular authorship. This
is true not only in prosecutions for forgery where not only forgery
but the authorship of the spurious writing must be proved,i but the
use of proved writings of the supposed or alleged forger or other
writer are admissable in other cases, since one who denies that he or
some other person wrote a signature or other questioned matter has a
right to corroborate his denial by showing who did write it.6 It seems
well to state here a fact not always understood, that while it is often
quite easy to prove that a given writing is forged, since the great
majority of forgeries are clumsy and unskillful affairs, it is often
very difficult or even impossible to identify the forger, particularly
where the amount of writing is small as in the case of a single sig-
nature, though single signatures are sometimes so skillfully forged as
3 See Spencer, supra note 1 at 123. See also Note (1901) 62 L. R. A. 817; WIG-
MORE, CASES ON EVIDENCE, 428-430; JONES, EVIDENCE, (Hor. ed.) §552, n. 16;
22 C. J. 774, n. 16.
4 See WIGIORE, CASES ON EVIDENCE, 428; Spencer, supra note 1 at 124, 3 WIG-
MORE, EVIDENCE (2d ed. 1923) §§2008, 2016; Note (1901) 62 L. R. A. 832;
OSBORN, QUESTIONED DOCUMENTS (2d ed.) 705; WIS. STAT. (1935) §327.26.
5Under the English statute comparison of writings with genuine writings of
the alleged writer and also with the genuine writing of the supposed or alleged
forger is permitted, [Creswell v. Jackson, 4 F. & F. 1, 5, 176 Eng. Rep. 440
(1864)] and this would doubtless be permissible under such a statute as our
own. See also Woolbridge v. State, 49 Fla. 187, 38 So. 3 (1905); Cook v.
Lambkin, 114 Ia. 664, 87 N.W. 665, (1901) ; State v. Bauer, 171 Minn. 345, 214
N.W. 262 (1927) ; Brown v. Hall, 85 Va. 146, 7 S.E. 182 (1888), will alleged
to have been forged by proponent; Easterday v. United States, 292 Fed. 664,
(D.C. App. 1923), forgery. As a practical matter it is very often impossible to
identify the forger from the forged writing alone, and other evidence such as
uttering or possession and attempts to utter must be resorted to. This is most
frequently true of a single signature, especially a traced signature.
6 Cook v. Moeckler, 217 Ill. App. 479 (1920); Brown v. Hall, supra, note 5;
Lathain v. Houston Land & Trust Co., (Tex. Civ. App. 1933) 62 S.W. (2d)
519. See and compare Peck v. Callaghan, 95 N.Y. 73 (1884) under the statute
of 1880, since amended so as to admit evidence by comparison to show forgery
by a third person. See also Spencer supra note 2, at 132.
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to defy detection even by the most competent expert.7 Indeed it is some-
times said to be almost axiomatic that the smaller the amount of ques-
tioned writing the greater the difficulty and uncertainty of proof of its
authenticity or its authorship. Indeed some courts have refused, largely
or wholly on this ground, to admit testimony based upon comparison
as to the genuineness or authorship of mere cross marks,8 while others
have admitted it in testamentary and contract cases on the basis of
proved standards, and evidence of this character has been admitted9
even without such standards in the ordinary sense, at least in election
cases where characteristic cross marks on a considerable number of
ballots were alleged to have been made by the same person.10 In some
forgery cases it is possible that there may be no standards in the
ordinary sense of the genuine writing of the one whose signature is
alleged to have been forged. This is sometimes the case where the
forgery involves some tracing process, though genuine writings as
standards of comparison are often highly useful even in such cases
and may be almost indispensible in a close or doubtful case as showing
such personal characteristics as shading, pen-pressure, line quality,
fluency and the like, very difficult to reproduce in a traced forgery. 1
7 See OSBORN, QUESTIONEDDCUMENTS (2d ed.) 282, 679, 680. There are a few
experts who might deny this statement, as there are a few who might deny
that they have ever made, or ever could make, a mistake in a handwriting
case. It may be well to say here that it has been apparently held within the
discretion of the court whether or not to require an expert on cross-examina-
tion to state whether he has ever made such a mistake or made a mistake in
a particular case. State v. Stetson, 204 Wis. 250, 235 N.W. 539 (1931). Similar
questions were permitted in the Hauptman Case. If this was error the de-
fendant had no ground of complaint, since they were just experts for the state.
8 See the recent case of In re Astolas Est. 273 Mich. 189, 262 N.W. 766 (1935).
For a digest of the more or less conflicting decisions on this subject, see
OSBORN, QUESTIONED DOcUMENTS (2d ed.) 930 et seq. See also In re Corcoran's
Will, 129 N.Y. Supp. 165 (1911). That a mark is not handwriting see Wolf v.
Gall, 176 Cal. 757, 169 Pac. 1017 (1917). The court could not see how an
expert in handwriting could bear evidence in the matter.9 State v. Tice, 30 Or. 457, 48 Pac. 367 (1897). See Ausinan and Moon v. People,
47 Colo. 167, 107 Pac. 204 (1909). The questioned mark in one case was a
smooth, firm, vigorous and rapidly made X, but the standard marks were
labored and tremulous Latin crosses. See also Strong v. Brewer, 17 Ala. 706,(1850), where a witness familiar with the peculiar cross mark of an illiterate
person was permitted to testify to it direct. To the same effect is In re Astolas
Estate, 273 Mich. 189, 262 N.W. 766 (1935).
10 See State v. Ryan, 79 Ohio St. 452 (1908). In this case, standards were used
showing peculiarity of ballot marks alleged to have been made by accused.
13 In a recent case tried in Milwaukee, three promissory notes were involved, all
being almost exact counterparts or facsimiles. It was quite clear that the
signatures were all traced from a common model which was not found, as
often happens in such cases. The genuine signatures of the alleged maker of
these notes, however, confirmed the fact of forgery, since they had a marked
degree of ease, freedom, fluency, smoothness and certainty of line direction
not found in the forgeries, a quality among others quite commonly lost where
the tracing process is employed. The forger confessed. See the celebrated
Rice-Patrick will case, In re Rice's Will, 81 N. Y. Supp. 68, 81 App. Div. 223(1903). See also Stitzel v. Miller, 250 Ill. 72, 95 N.E. 53, 34 L.R.A. (N. s.)
1004 (1911). Careful patching and retouching and unusual pen lifts and sud-
den changes in line direction are not infrequent in traced forgeries, as is also
true of simulated forgeries.
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In cases of material alteration by mere erasure, whether chemical or
by abrasion, the document itself without standards of comparison may
be the sole available basis of judgment and decision. 2 So, in certain
cases, the order or sequence of writing may be shown without ref-
erence to extrinsic standards from a miscroscopic examination of the
document itself.' Again a typed document dated earlier than 1872
is not possibly authentic, at least as to date,'I and no amount of stand-
ard material would rebut that fact; and no such document is thus
authentic when no machine showing such type or such style or design
of type as the document discloses existed on that date, 15 and there
are other cases where standards in the ordinary sense are not
required.16
12 Such cases are comparatively rare since something is usually substituted for
the matter erased. The process of chemical fuming will sometimes restore the
latter temporarily so that it may be read and photographed and much has re-
cently been done in this respect by the ultra violet ray process of photography.23 This fact is ordinarily microscopic and may appear from the issuing or run-
ning out of the ink from the line last made upon the line first made where
such lines cross. Technical discussion of this matter is impossible here since
the field of possible error in cases of this class is quite considerable. See
OSBORN, QUEsTIONEDDOCUMENTS (2d ed.) c. 27, particularly pp. 517, 518.
Closely related to the question of the order or sequence of writing is that
of writing over folds. Standards in any ordinary sense are not useful or
available on this question alone. In a criminal case tried here, involving an
alleged illegal sale of a mortgaged car, the complaining witness testified that
the mortgage paper was completely written by him before it was signed by the
defendant, and that it had not been folded at that time. The physical evidence
was plainly to the contrary since the pen, in adding a short mortgage clause to
a promisory note in ordinary printed and written form, had not only gone
into the "gutter" formed by folding, but had so pierced the paper there that
the ink had gone through to the other side in at least two places. The de-
fendant, who swore he had signed nothing but a note, was acquitted. See
OSBORN, QUESTIONED DOCUMENTS, (2d ed.) 521 et seq.
14 This is a matter of encyclopedic knowledge. See WHARTON, CRIMINAL Evi-
DENCE, §425A.
25 See Lyon v. Oliver, 316 Ill. 292, 147 N.E. 251 (1925) ; Gamble v. Second Nat.
Bank, in MICH. ST. BAR JOUR. Vol. IV, No. 8. As to disputed typewriting and
admission of standards of comparison in such cases see Grantv. Jack, 116 Me.
242, 102 AtI. 38 (1917) ; People v. Storrs, 207 N.Y. 147, 100 N.E. 730 (1912) ;
State v. Uhls, 121 Kan. 377, 247 Pac. 1050 (1926). See also Spencer, supra
note 2, n. 33, as to identifying characteristics that may develop in a particular
machine. People v. Storrs, supra; State v. Freshwater, 30 Utah 442. 85 Pac.
447, 116 Am. St. Rep. 853 (1906). See also OSBORN, QUESTIONED DOCUMENTS
(2d ed.) c. 37.
18In Ryan v. Rockford Ins. Co., 85 Wis. 573, 55 N.W. 1025 (1893), a deed pur-
ported to have been executed in 1884 by a grantor who died the same year.
Evidence that the form upon which the deed was written was not printed
until 1887 sustained a finding of forgery. See also Strickland v. Strickland,
(Ark. 1910) 129 S. W. 801; In re Oliver's Will, 126 Misc. 511, 214 N. Y. Supp.
154 (1926). This last case involved a will written on a blank form not in ex-
istence when the will was dated. The code letters at the top of the blank in-
dicating date and name of printer had been cut off, but the tail of a comma
remained which, from its position, "vociferously" proclaimed the date of
printing as later than that of the will. See OSBORN, QUESTIONED DOCUMENTS
(2d ed.) 486. Water marks will sometimes show that the paper on which an
instrument was written was not manufactured until a later date, and the con-
dition of crossed lines may sometimes (though not always) show the order or
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Save in exceptional cases as above suggested the document exam-
iner, however competent, is as helpless without standards as a ship
in strange seas without compass, chart or rudder. First and foremost,
however, no writing should be submitted to an expert or other prospec-
tive witness or to the jury as a standard of comparison with a ques-
tioned writing unless such standard can be proved genuine to the satis-
faction of the court, unless it is properly in the case as genuine for
some other purpose." Even under the older rule broadly excluding
extrinsic standards of comparison, but permitting comparison with
papers already properly in the case as part of the files or records
thereof to be used as standards of comparison, the latter were admitted
under the earlier theory of the English common law courts, not so
much because their use as such might aid the jurors in determining
the issue with respect to a disputed document, but largely because it
was practically impossible to exclude such writings from their con-
sideration.'8 However, in spite of the fact that extrinsic standards of
comparison duly proved may now be quite freely used, it should be
remembered that a comparison of the disputed writing with writings
already in the case as genuine may sometimes be of great or even
decisive value in determining the question of genuineness and they
should not be overlooked.19 The same is generally true of papers prop-
sequence of the writing in particular cases. See supra note 13. Staples and
fasteners with which a document is bound may sometimes prove strong evi-
dence against the forger and a copyright imprint in a family bible has dis-
authenticated dated entries therein.
'2 See OsBoRN, QUESTIONED DOCUMENTS (2d ed.) 13. The submission of unprov-
able writings, even to a competent expert, is often bad practice as tending
possibly to influence and confuse his judgment, which must be based upon
proved standards or upon writings already in the case. In this connection
see Steel v. Snyder, 295 Pa. 120, 144 Atl. 912 (1929). It should be noted that
while a writing might be proved to be genuine it still might not be admitted
as a standard because it was illegally obtained (see infra note 48) or because
of its self-serving character. See infra note 41.
18 See Spencer, supra note 1 at 116 et seq; also 3 WIGMORE, EVIDENCE (2d ed.)
.§1991, 1992.
29 See 22 C. J. 772, n. 98 et seq.
In the midst of a trial an opinion was asked as to the geniuneness of the
defendant's signature to a contract. The defendant had already made a num-
ber of request signatures for comparison and was apparently ready, able and
willing to make many more. There was so much superficial variation between
these signatures and the questioned signature as to raise considerable doubt
as to the genuineness of the questioned signature and the court was reluctant
to grant a substantial amount of time for any extended examination and com-
parison. Suspecting that the defendant was disguising his hand in making the
test writings, the "papers in the case" were examined. Defendant's signature
to his verified answer solved the issue of genuineness in favor of the plaintiff.
In another case, but a single genuine signature was the sole standard sub-
mitted for comparison with a questioned one purporting to have been written
nineteen years later. A will and codicil, duly filed and admitted to probate,
executed at about the date of the last or questioned writing in the execution
clauses and on the margins of the several pages, revealed about a dozen sig-
natures, all of which indicated a marked change in the testator's signature
No. 41
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erly received in evidence as admittedly genuine for some purpose other
than comparison with the writing in dispute,20 though they may not be
part of the record proper in the strictly technical sense.
Returning to the subject of purely and technically extrinsic stand-
ards, it is now the almost universal rule in England, Canada and in
the United States, that they are not admissible in evidence as the
basis of comparison with a disputed writing, whether by ju-ors or
witnesses, unless they are proved to the satisfaction of the court to
be the genuine writing of the person whose chirography is in dispute,
and under the best practice this proof should be made before any
testimony based upon their comparison with the questioned writing
is received,21 or they are submitted to the court or to both court and
jury as the basis of decision, 22 whether with or without the aid of
expert testimony. This preliminary question of genuiness is in most
states one of fact for the court alone, and its decision must be deemed
during the interval of nineteen years. The writer declined to testify for the
claimant. See infra, notes 49 et seq. as to age of standards.
There is some authority for excluding signatures to pleadings in the case
as standards on the ground that they might be self-serving. Springer v. Hall,
83 Mo. 693, 53 Am Rep. 598 (1884) ; Forbes v. Wiggins, 112 N.C. 122, 16 S.E.
905 (1893) ; Travers v. Snyder, 38 Ill. App. 379 (1890). See also Doud v. Reid,
53 Mo. App. 553 (1883), signature of defendant to plea of non est factum.
Compare Eisenrath v. Kallineyer, 61 Mo. App. 430 (1895) ; State v. David, 131
Mo. 380, 33 S.W. 28 (1895). In many cases signed pleadings have been ad-
mitted, 22 C. J. 773, note 6; Tower v. Whip, 54 W. Va. 158, 44 S.E. 179, 63
L. R. A. 937 (1903); Korbeck v. Shannon, 101 Fla. 598, 135 So. 131 (1931).
20 See 22 C. J. 772; Gladsberry v. Home Mut. L. Assn., (Tex. Civ. App. 1933)
57S.W. (2d) 370.21 See Spencer, supra note 1 at n. 31; 22 C. J. 781, n. 81; Pitts v. Thompson,
(Tex. Civ. App. 1934) 71 S.W. (2d) 368; that party against whom a stand-
ard is proposed to be used may be required to testify as to whether he wrote
it, Nixon v. Shaver, (W. Va. 1934) 176 S.E. 849.
The occasional practice of some courts is to admit proof of the standards
at any time during the trial, but with some exceptions this is probably not to
be commended where it can reasonably be avoided. See, however, Matter of
Marchall, 126 Cal. 95, 58 Pac. 449 (1899), holding it immaterial that the stand-
ard was not proved genuine when submitted for comparison, if its genuineness
was afterward proved.
22 It seems to be the rule under most statutes that the evidence or proof of
standards is addressed to the court or judge and not to the jury. In a cele-
brated case, however, it seems to have been held that while the genuineness
of standards is for the court in the first instance, it becomes the duty of thejury in turn to decide as to the genuineness of the standards under proper
instructions. People v. Molineux, 168 N.Y. 330, 61 N.E. 286, 62 L.R.A.
3, (1901), with which compare McKay v. Lasher, 121 N. Y. 477, 24 N. E.
711 (1890). The New York statute uses "court" instead of "judge" as does
the Wisconsin statute but we find no Wisconsin case adopting the rule of
People v. Molineux requiring the jury as well as the judge to pass upon the
genuineness of the standards. See also Chisholm v. State, 204 Ala. 69, 85 So.
462 (1920), to the effect that if the jury finds a standard not genuine it must
lay it out of view together with all evidence based thereon. Williamns v. Conger
125 U. S. 397, 8 Sup. Ct. 893 (1888). See also Plymouth Say. & L. Assn. v.
Kassing, 72 Ind. App. 1, 125 N.E. 488 (1919), that question of genuineness of
standard is for court in the first instance, but is ultimately for the jury. See
also 10 R. C. L. 626, n. 9.
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final, and conclusive where there is proper legal evidence to support
it.2
3 As to what is proper, competent or sufficient proof of genuineness
of standards much might be said. An admission of genuineness by the
party against whom they are sought to be used is ordinarily suffi-
cient,24 and so of circumstances amounting to an estoppel against him.2 5
While a standard itself cannot be proved by mere comparison with
other writings by experts,26 it may be proved by the direct tesitmony
of those who saw it written,27 and by some authorities by that of
witnesses who speak from previous personal knowledge of the writing
of the alleged author of the standard, 28 though the contrary and less
liberal rule has more often been asserted, where the witness speaks
23 See JONES, EVIDENCE (Hor. ed.) §555; 27 C. 3. 783, nn 94-97. It has been said
that the decision of the court in such cases must be treated as a verdict, Lay
v. Wissnran, 36 Iowa 305 (1873); Plymouth Say. & L. Assn. v. Kassing, 72
Ind. App. 1, 125 N. E. 488 (1919). See also Phillips v. Conant, (Del. Super.
1935) 180 Atl. 593. But compare the cases in the preceding note.24Admission in such cases, at least under the older rule excluding extrinsic
standards generally, has been held to require a judicial admission either in the
pleadings or in open court. See 22 C. J. 782, n. 87. See also Moore v. United
States, 91 U.S. 270, 23 L.ed. 346 (1875); Southwestern Milling Co. v. Fern-
strom, 226 Ill. App. 468 (1922), concession by counsel held sufficient.
Though a party offering his own writing as a standard cannot prove it by
his own admission, [3 JONE s, EVIDENCE (Hor. ed.) §555, n. 51 et seq.; Shorb v.
McKenzie, 80 Ind. 500 (1881)], a party to a civil action against whom a pro-
posed standard is offered may be required to testify as to its genuineness at
the instance of his adversary. Nixon v. Shaver, (W. Va. 1934) 176 S.E. 849,
with which compare, Ashwell v. Miller, 54 Ind. App. 381, 103 N.E. 37(1913). See also Hancock v. Snider, 101 W. Va. 535, 133 S.E. 131 (1926)
where refusal to require production by defendant of standards under sub-
poena duces tecum was held error, few standard writings being otherwise
available. To similar effect see Tenny v. Arnold, (Ohio App. 1929) 165 N.E.
751.
25 As where writings are introduced as genuine by party claiming thereunder.
Kennedy v. Upshatw, 64 Tex. 411 (1885); Sinyth v. Caswell, 67 Tex. 567, 4
S.W. 848 (1887) ; State v. Tinrpkins, 71 Mo. 613 (1880); Croon v. Sugg, 110
N.C. 259, 14 S.E. 748 (1892) ; Burton v. Lowry, (Tex. Civ. App. 1934) 77 S.W.
(2d) 1059.
26 Winch v. Norman, 65 Iowa 186, 21 N. W. 511 (1884); Sankey v. Cook, 85
Iowa 125, 47 N. W. 1077 (1891); Plymouth Say. & Loan Assn. v. Kassing,
72 Ind. App. 1, 125 N. E. 488 (1919); Cammonwealth v. Eastman, 55 Mass.
189 (1848) ; In re Astolas Estate, 273 Mich. 189, 262 N.W. 766 (1935). The
last case involved a signature to a will by mark. No genuine mark was in evi-
dence and the witness had never seen testatrix write so his opinion was
excluded. Archer v. United States, 9 Okla. 569, 60 Pac. 268 (1900). See also
Parker v. Bascle, 154 La. 1027, 98 So. 628 (1923).
27 Sankey v. Cook, 82 Iowa 125, 128, 47 N. W. 1077 (1891); Pl3nnouth Say. &
Loan Assn. v. Kassing, 72 Ind. App. 1, 125 N. E. 488 (1919); Phillips v.
Conant, (Del. Super. 1935) 180 Atl. 593; State v. Fillpot, 51 Wash. 223, 98
Pac. 659 (1908) ; also Roloson's Estate, 79 Pa. Super Ct. 124, holding that re-
ceipts signed while witnesses were present and delivered to them for money
paid, were sufficiently proved, though they did not see the pen pass over the
paper.
28 Phillips v. Conant, supra note 27; Bell v. Brewster, 44 Ohio St. 690, 10 N. E.
679 (1887) Archer v. United States, 9 Okla. 569, 60 Pac. 268 (1900) ; Williams
v. Williams, 109 Me. 537, 85 Atl. 43 (1912) ; McKay v. Lascher, 121 N. Y. 477,
24 N. E. 711 (1890).
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from mere general knowledge,29 at least in the absence of corroborat-
ing facts and circumstances. 30 It is also sometimes said, either in
express terms or in effect that the proof of standards must be direct
and positive,31 or clear and positive 2 or beyond all doubt or cavil,83
or clear and undoubted,3 4 or most satisfactory,3 5 or proof beyond a
reasonable doubt,30 or that the genuineness of the exemplar should be
established in no uncertain degree, by no uncertain means. 36 a However,
failure to make timely objection to use of a writing offered as a
standard has been held to amount to a practical admission of its
genuineness.31
Question has naturally arisen whether the mere receipt of letters
purporting to have been written by the person whose handwriting is in
dispute warrants their admission as standards of comparison. Gen-
erally it does not38 though it has been held otherwise where there is
satisfactory corroborative or collateral evidence.39 Paid and cancelled
293 JONES, EVIDENCE (Hor. ed.) §555, n. 46; 22 C. J. 783, n. 92. See also Tar-
water v. Donley State Bank, (Tex. Civ. App. 1925) 277 S. W. 176; Simonson
v. Typer 285 Fed. 240 (C. C. A. 8th, 1922).
30 The general rule excluding the evidence of those who speak from personal
knowledge or familiarity with the handwriting of the standard should not be
arbitrarily applied even where this rule prevails. See Newton Centre Tr. Co. v.
Stuart, 201 Mass. 288, 87 N. E. 630 (1909). The positive testimony of an in-
telligent witness long familiar with the standard writing through business,
official or family association or connection or correspondence should, it would
seem, be sufficient where the witness is in no wise impeached, especially where
there is no suspicion of prejudice or interest. See Burdell v. Taylor, 89 Cal.
613, 26 Pac. 1094 (1891). See also Phillips v. Conant, (Del. Super. 1935) 180
Atl. 593, where a witness familiar with defendant's hand found writings on
defendant's table. The writings were admitted as standards, though the wit-
ness had not seen them written.
s1 Winch v. Norman, 65 Iowa 186, 21 N. W. 511 (1884). See also Sankey v. Cook,
82 Iowa 125, 128, 47 N. W. 1077 (1891); Hyde v. Woolfolk, 1 Iowa 159 (1855).
In Sankey v. Cook, supra, it was held that the proof must be such as to
satisfy the court so that it can rule in favor of genuineness as matter of law.32See 22 C. J. 782, n. 89.
88 Green v. Terwilliger, 56 .Fed. 384 (C. C. Or. 1892).
S4McKeone v. Barnes, 108 Mass. 344, 347 (1871) ; Covmon'wealth v. Eastman,
1 Cush. (Mass.) 189, 48 Am. Dec. 596 (1848) ; Pitts v. Thompson, (Tex. Civ.
App. 1934) 71 S.W. (2d) 368; University of Illinois v. Spalding, 71 N.H. 163,
51 Atl. 731, 62 L.R.A. 817 (1901).
35 See Keveton v. Keding, (Tex. Civ. App. 1926) 286 S. W. 673.
36 Bragg v. Colwell, 19 Ohio St. 407 (1869) ; Haycock v. Greup, 57 Pa. 438 (1868).
In People v. Molineux, 168 N. Y. 264, 61 N. E. 286, 62 L. R. A. 193 (1901),
the rule of fair preponderance was said to obtain in civil cases and proof be-
yond a reasonable doubt in criminal cases. See also Rowell v. Fuller, 59 Vt.
688, 10 Atl. 853 (1887) to the effect that while great care should be taken in
admitting standards, the general rule as to fair balance of testimony applies.
aa Chisholin v. State, 204 Ala. 69, 85 So. 462 (1920).
s' Sanderson v. Osgood, 52 Vt. 309 (1880). See also Shaw v. Bryant, 90 Hun 374,
384, 35 N. Y. Supp. 909 (1895).
8 Taylor-Wharton Iron & Steel Co. v. Earnshaw, 259 Mass. 554, 156 N. E. 855
(1927); Flowers v. Fletcher, 40 W.Va. 103, 20 S.E. 870 (1894); Beloit v.
Greene, 43 Idaho 265, 251 Pac. 621 (1926).
S9 Taylor-Wharton Iron & Steel Co. v Earnshaw, supra note 38; letters from
defendant to plaintiff signed in defendant's name and enclosing check. Poole
v. Belier, 104 W.Va. 547, 140 S.E. 534 (1927) ; letters received at variant peri-
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checks purporting to have been signed by the one whose writing is in
dispute are frequently offered as standards, particularly where signa-
tures to other instruments are questioned, and are quite frequently
received and admitted as standards without question or objection.
This practice, however, may involve some peril, and it has quite
recently been held that such checks found among the papers of an
absentee were not sufficiently proved as standards without further
evidence of their genuineness. 39a
By the weight of reason and authority unproved writings cannot
be used to test the knowledge and ability of a witness on cross exam-
ination, even though the witness is an expert.40 Before going further
into the subject of handwriting standards, it should be kept constantly
in mind that what is otherwise a good case may be lost because the
standards of comparison are insufficient in number or unsuitable in
kind even though legally proved genuine under the law. By the great
weight of authority a party whose writing is in dispute is not entitled
to use as a standard of comparison in his own favor a writing prepared
by him for use at the trial.4 oa While many of the cases involve writ-
ings so made and offered, we see no reason why all other writings
made after controversy has arisen or even after action is brought should
be excluded as standards where the circumstances are such as to nega-
tive the idea that they were made for the purpose of the case.41
ods prior to purported writer's death. Letters acted upon; Thorpe v. Gisburne,
2 Car. & Pac. 21, 172 Eng. Rep. 10 (1825). That a letter was received in reply
to letter sent is not alone sufficient to establish the genuineness of the latter
as a standard. See McKeone v. Barnes, 108 Mass. 344 (1871). This rule of ex-
clusion has been applied though the inference from the reply is confirmed by
the contents and postmark of the letter. Desbrow v. Farrow, 3 Rich. L. 382
(S. C. 1831). See also Murray v. Walker, 83 Iowa 202, 48 N. W. 1075 (1891).
39a See Plymnouth Say. & L. Assn. v. Kassing, 72 Ind. App. 1, 125 N.E. 488 (1919).
The element of danger in accepting without question paid and cancelled checks
as standards is suggested by Wussow v. Badger State Bank, 204 Wis. 467, 234
N. W. 730 (1931). Here plaintiff depositor failed to check his bank account
and examine his vouchers for more than a year. In the meantime the bank
paid 392 obviously forged checks among a total of some 1200. A selection
from this interesting mass for use as standards in any case involving Mr.
Wussow's signature would very possibly have led to trouble and confusion
had they been received as proved standards on the basis of the fact alone that
they had been paid and returned by the bank. This case involved great interest
and some excitement in banking circles. The plaintiff recovered. See also Pitts
v. Thompson (Tex. Civ. App. 1934) 71 S. W. (2d) 368.
40 See 22 C. J. 783, n. 99 and Spencer, supra notes 1 and 2. That the Wisconsin
rule excludes unproved writings on cross examination see Alisch v. Haave, 178
Wis. 19, 189 N. W. 155 (1922). That this method of cross-examination may be
unwise even where it is permitted, see Spenser, supra note 2 at 141.
40a See 3 JONES, EVIDENCE (Hor. ed.) §553, n. 6; Phillips v. Conant, (Del. Super.
1935) 180 Atl. 593; 22 C. J. 784 n. 6; King v. Donahue, 110 Mass. 155, 14 Am.
Rep. 589 (1872) and Note (1902) 63 L. R. A. 440. See also Spencer, supra
note 1 at 128, 129; People v. Meyer, 289 Ill. 184, 124 N.E. 447 (1919) ; Shillnn v.
Settle, 222 Ill. App. 463 (1921).
41 The mere fact that the writing was made after the dispute arose or action
was brought should not be enough to exclude it as a standard where circum-
stances are such as to negative the idea that it was self-serving or made for
No. 4]
THE MARQUETTE LAW REVIEW
A signed answer in the case has been excluded, however, on the
ground that it might have been intentionally so made as to be self-
serving.4 2 While a party cannot be permitted over objection to make
and offer at the trial a specimen of his own writing, 3 in England
under statute, and without direct or specific statutory authority here,
the court has power in the exercise of a sound discretion to require
a party whose signature or other writing is an issue to write in the
presence of the jury,- and a writing so made on cross-examination
by request of the adverse party is plainly admissible for comparison
as against his opponent who has denied making the writing in ques-
tion.45 A defendant in a criminal case who offers himself as a witness
on his own behalf may, if he denies the making of a document in
issue, be required on cross-examination to write from dictation the
matter contained therein and the writing thus made may be used as a
standard of comparison as against him.4sa
Aside from the writings made under the direction of the court,
writings voluntarily made by a party for the use of his adversary or
others as a basis of comparison with another writing may be called
request writings as a mere term of convenience rather than of art.
Such writings may no doubt be used as standards of comparison if
duly proved or admitted in spite of the fact that they may not be the
the occasion as where it was made in due course of business and naturally and
unconstrainedly. See University of Illinois v. Spalding, 71 N. H. 163, 51 Atl.
731, 62 L. R. A. 817 (1901). See the authorities cited in the preceding note.
If the standard is produced by the side opposed to the writer, People v. Moli-
neux, 168 N. Y. 264, 61 N. E. 286, 62 L. R. A. 193 (1901), it is admissible
though made post litem mnotain.
42 See Shorb v. Kinzie, 100 Ind. 429 (1884) ; Travers v. Snyder, 38 Ill. App. 379
(1890); Springer v. Hall, 83 Mo. 693, 53 Am. Rep. 598 (1884). See, however,
the cases cited in note 19, supra, and compare 22 C. J. 773, nn. 6 and 7; Frank
v. Berry, 128 Iowa 223, 103 N. W. 358 (1905). Signed plea admissible against
one who denies his signature to note; Korbeck v. Shannon, 101 Fla. 598, 135
So. 131 (1931).
43 As to this there is practically no dissent. See 22 C. J. 784, n. 12. However,
where the plaintiff in cross examination required the defendant to write, the
error, if any, in permitting him to write in the first instance was one of which
plaintiff was estopped to complain. Allen v. Gardner, 47 Kan. 337, 27 Pac.
982 (1891).
44See 22 C. J. 785, n. 14. Most of the cases denying such power were decided
prior to the statutes permitting extrinsic standards. The power of the court
in such cases, however, is discretionary. See JoNEs, EVIDENCE, (Hor. ed.) 550,
n. 6. In Williains v. Riches, 77 Wis. 569, 46 N. W. 817, 417 (1890), where the
witness testified that she signed receipts years earlier as a child and that her
hand had since greatly changed and improved, the refusal to order her to
write was not in error. See also First Nat. Bank v. Robert, 41 Mich. 709, 3
N. W. 199 (1879).
45See 22 C. J. 785, n. 16. This is primarily for the purpose of contradicting the
witness, though it is also classed as in the nature of an experiment. A writing
made in open court at the request of the opposite party may of course be
used by him, State v. Gordon, 32 N. D. 31, 155 N. W. 59 (1915). See also
State v. Barnard, 176 Minn. 349, 223 N.W. 452 (1929), cross-examination of
defendant in criminal case.
45a State v. McHenry, 207 Iowa 760, 223 N. W. 535 (1929).
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most reliable exemplars of the natural writing of those making them,
especially where suit is pending, or accusation, or perhaps ex-
posure imminent, though nothing more than disgrace or loss of social
standing or prestige may ensue as would be the case with some anon-
ymous letters.
While no one is bound to incriminate himself, one who writes
freely and voluntarily and without coercion and by request, even when
in custody under a criminal charge, cannot object to the use against
him of writings so made as standards of comparison. 46 Innocent parties
seldom object to making such writings and the guilty may fear to
refuse to make them or may not realize or appreciate the peculiar
characteristics of their own writing, or may even have an unbounded
and usually unwarranted confidence in their ability to disguise their
hands, or may even have the ability to do so, at least in exceptional
cases.4 6a An entire chapter might be written as to the adequacy of
test writings under various circumstances and conditions, some parts
of which might be suggestive and valuable to the police.
4 7
That offered standards of comparison were secured by means of
unlawful search and seizure has been held ground for their exclusion
where there was timely application for their exclusion on that
ground.48 If a writing is proved to the satisfaction of the court to be
the genuine writing of the person whose hand is in dispute, its age or
date alone ordinarily goes to its weight and not to its admissibility
as a standard of comparison. 49 As a general rule, however, standards
should, so far as possible, be fairly contemporaneous with the dis-
46 People v. Molineux, 168 N. Y. 264, 61 N. E. 286, 62 L. R. A. 193 (1901) ; State
v. Scott, 63 Or. 44, 128 Pac. 441 (1912) ; Magnuson v. State, 187 Wis. 122, 203
N.W. 749 (1925); United States v. Mullaney, 32 Fed. 370 (E.D. Mo. 1887).
That the accused wrote reluctantly does not render his writing inadmissible
against him, provided he wrote without compulsion. State v. Martenson, 26
Utah 312, 73 Pac. 562, 633 (1903).
46a In Magnuson v. State, supra, note 46, the defendant willingly wrote or pen-
printed repeatedly from dictation the address on a bomb package sent through
the mails, remarking: "Writing you can tell, but printing you can't tell any-
thing about." He knows better now. For a discussion of this case and the
scientific methods of detection and proof involved see Prof. J. H. Mathews in
Wis. State Bar Assn. Proceedings, June 1924.
47 For a very complete and practical discussion of this matter of test or request
writings see OSBORN, QUESTIONED DOCUMENTS (2d ed.) pp. 32 et seq. and
OSBORN, PROBLEM OF PROOF, C. XXI.
48 People v. Brocanmp, 307 Ill. 448, 138 N.E. 728 (1923). Cf. Citizens Nat. Bank
v. Custis, 153 Md. 235, 138 AtI. 261 (1927). Search of the person of one law-
fully under arrest for felony or of his portable personal possessions as an
incident of such arrest is ordinarily permissible and articels of evidence so
secured may be used as evidence against him. See 56 C. J. 1202. See also State
v. Vey, 21 S. D. 612, 114 N. W. 719 (1908).49 Butman v. Christy, 197 Iowa 661, 198 N.W. 314 (1924). We find no case re-
jecting a standard on account of age or date alone as compared with that of
the questioned writing. In fact, under the common law, it seems that ancient
documents coming from proper custody were admissible as standards though
far earlier in date than the writing in dispute. See Spencer, supra note 1 at 120.
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puted writing, and it is often quite dangerous to use standards of
date very remote from that of the questioned writing. As pointed out
in a previous article, the selection of too early or too late a model
has sometimes worked the undoing of the forger.50 Even the lapse of
a comparatively short time may affect the value of a handwriting
standard, as where there has been an intervening change in the physi-
cal condition of the writer, as from the weakness of illness to health
and strength.51 Where the time that has elapsed between the questioned
writing and the standard is quite long, senile characteristics may of
course develop in the genuine writing of the individual, especially
tremor not found in the questioned writing or in standards written in
middle age or earlier.52 The change in the writing of young persons
going from school into business is often quite marked and compara-
tively rapid, especially where their employment involves much practi-
cal writing.53 There is sometimes such great similarity in school writ-
ing as to make it difficult to distinguish the work of two or more
pupils taught the same system, especially where they are taught by
the same teacher. 54
5o'1the idea of the forger, and particularly the novice, often is that any genuine
writing of the person whose writing is to be traced or simulated will serve
his purpose, or else no other model is available. See Marble v. Marble's Estate,
223 Ill. App. 524 (1922), affd., 304 Ill. 231, 136 N.E. 589 (1922).
51 In a contested will case tried in Milwaukee in 1929 the testator died of cancer
of the stomach shortly after making his will. The contestant's standards were
all dated about a year prior to death. The expert for the contestants testified
that he did not believe that the testator, in view of his physical condition,
could have made as good a capital j as there was in his will signature. Pro-
ponents introduced a signature of testator made two days before the will date,
bearing quite as good a J as was found in the signature to the will. Other
almost contemporaneous standards showed that the testator retained his ability
to write quite well up to the last. The will was sustained as against the claim
of forgery.
52 The problem of tremor in writing is not as simple as it might seem to be. It
is of course quite plainly presented where the standard writing is free from
it, or comparatively so, and it is found in the questioned writing to a marked
or greater degree, or the reverse appears. Tremors of age, weakness or illiter-
acy are not always distinguishable, but it is often easier to distinguish them
from the tremor of fraud which may even involve an attempt to simulate
the tremor of genuine writing used as a standard or copy by the forger, or
tremor may be an incident to the very nafure of the forging process itself. See
OSBORN, QUESTIONED DOCUMENTS, (2d ed.) 110, 112, 113.
53 In a recent criminal case the earliest available standards were seven years
later than the questioned writing. While a rather marked change was found
which somewhat perplexed the court and the witness, enough that was quite
characteristic survived to convict the defendant, a young man of 26. After the
trial an old gentleman produced a contemporaneous signature that confirmed
the correctness of the decision. This ancient had sat there and heard the expert
qualify his testimony on account of the comparative lateness of the standards
but had omitted to reach into his pocket and produce the very thing that was
needed to make conviction certain-a signature made within a month of the
disputed one.
54 This fact is well known to all observant writing teachers. The dead level of
sameness thereby produced was brought forward against the old copy book
system of teaching long prevalent and still somewhat used, and also against
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Though it has been held in at least one case that there must be
more than one standard of comparison,55 this cannot be an arbitrary
rule, especially where no other standards are available. On the other
hand it seems that the court in the exercise of a sound discretion
would have power to limit within reasonable bounds the number of
standards on either side.58 The amount of standard material or writing
to be used, however, must depend very much upon the nature of the
particular case. In signature cases five signatures are usually better
than one, and ten or a dozen are better than five, or even more may be
desirable in some cases.5 7 In anonymous letter cases a single standard
letter containing a considerable amount of writing may suffice, though
more standard material should often be obtained5 8 including the writ-
ing of all those suspected of authorship of the anonymous writing.5
Accusations should never be hastily made in these "poison pen" cases,65
and especially public ones as there are laws against defamation.
Pencil written standards may lawfully be compared with pen writ-
ing and vice versa.6 1 Where pencil writing is in question, however,
the vertical system, a common educational nuisance in the middle nineties. One
difficulty in dealing with school writing is the danger of mistaking system
characteristics for individual or personal characteristics or peculiarities. See
OSBORN, QUESTIONED DOCUmENTS, (2d ed.) 30, 383.
55 Barfield v. Hewlett, 6 Mart. (N. s.) 78 (La. 1827).56 That this course would often be a dangerous one is a proposition that re-
quires no argument or citation in its support. The Kentucky statute expressly
empowers the judge to limit the number of standards.
5 Mr. Osborn seems to think that seventy-five is about the maximum number
that should be used, at least in questioned signature cases. See OsoRr,
QUESTIONED DocuMENTS (2d ed.) 27. A single signature, as for example one
found on the signature card of a bank, may be sufficient basis for comparison
where it is quite skilful or highly individualized or the alleged forgery is ob-
viously bungling or suspicious. In many cases, however, it is unwise to rely
upon a single standard of this kind where current signatures made in course
of business can be obtained, as paid checks or other commercial paper.
58 Into the subject of anonymous letters it is impossible to go in any detail. They
may not only involve script or handwriting in the ordinary sense, but type-
writing and pen and pencil writing, and where script or pen or pencil writing
or printing are employed there is very frequently a studied attempt at disguise.
We recall one of Conan Doyle's stories in which an anonymous letter was
produced by two persons in which each of whom wrote an alternate word.
Though writing in a single anonymous communication may sometimes be
successfully disguised, the writer has great difficulty in consistently carrying
out through a series of such writings the expedients first adopted to conceal
his identity. For this reason it is often advisable to preserve anonymous mis-
sives, together with their envelopes or wrappers, in the expectation that more
will come. Each of such writings may thus become in a sense a standard as
to other writings in the series.
59 The writing of those who are, or claim to be, recipients of anonymous com-
munications should often be investigated since cases are by no means rare
where the anonymous writer seeks to disarm suspicion by addressing some of
his letters to himself, and other motives for so doing are sometimes present.
It has been said that about twenty per cent of the cases involve this fact.60 See OssoRN, QUESTIONED DOCUMENTS, (2d ed.) 392.
61 There is nothing in the statutes permitting the comparison of handwriting
that renders this statement inaccurate. See Groff v. Groff, 209 Pa. 603, 59 Atl.
65 (1904).
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penciled standards should be included if possible. Where the questioned
writing is with pen, such significant means of identification as pen-
pressure, pen-holding and shading habits and line quality are not well
exemplified by pencil standards.62 Photographs of standards lost or
destroyed may doubtless be used upon much the same principle that
photographs of the questioned document may be used under such
circumstances where the accuracy of such photographs is shown, at
least where the genuineness of the original standard has been already
satisfactorily established in the case. 63 Large clear photographs are
especially useful in cases involving questioned typewriting. Carbon
copies of handwriting and typewriting have been admitted as stand-
ards on the ground that they are to all intents and purposes dupli-
cate originals," but letter-press copies have been rejected,65 and so have
tracings from genuine writings.66
62 This is, of course, fair matter of comment and argument where penciled
standards alone are produced, in spite of the fact that form characteristics are
generally the same in pen and pencil writing.
63 See Luco v. United States, 23 How. 515, 16 L. ed. 545 (1860). See also Moncus
v. Western Life Indemnity Co., 269 Pa. 213, 112 Atl. 476 (1921); Stetzel v.
Miller, 250 Ill. 72, 95 N.E. 53 (1911) ; Fenlon v. State, 195 Wis. 416, 217 N.W.
711 (1928). As to photographs to better illustrate the physical facts see
Spencer, supra note 1 at 125; Fenlon v. State. The interesting opinion of
the late Justice Doerfler in this case (430, 431) seems to go somewhat further
than competent document experts would go in favor of the theories of the
graphologists and in attributing belief in those theories to the experts them-
selves. See OsBoRN, QUESTIONED DocuMENTs (2d ed.) c. 24.
While photographs are ordinarily classed as secondary evidence and it has
been held improper to admit photographs of natural size of documents already
in evidence, [Howard v. Illinois Trust & Savings Bank, 189 Ill. 307, 59 N. E.
1106 (1901)], enlarged photographs of both questioned and standard writings
are now very freely admitted on much the same principle that magnifying
glasses may be used as an aid to sight. See Spencer, supra n. 1 at 125; Hancock
v. Snider, 101 W. Va. 535, 133 S.E. 131 (1926) ; Howard v. Illinois Trust &
Savings Bank, supra. Photographs may also be cut apart and grouped or ar-
ranged so as to present the whole or parts of the questioned and standard
writings in close proximity or juxtaposition and are often very useful when
so arranged in bringing difference and similarities simultaneously within the
field of vision on a single sheet. See WIGMORx, EVIDENCE (2d ed. 1923) §797;
Adams v. Ristine, 138 Va. 173, 122 S.E. 126, 31 A.L.R. 1413, 1432 (1924). See
also Spencer, supra note 2 at 146, n. 57.
While properly made photographs of handwriting as just discussed are of
great value in many cases, and especially in jury trials, and it is often false
economy to stint with respect to them, the court no doubt may, in the exer-
cise of a sound discretion, limit the number of photographs that may be ad-
mitted upon much the same principles that it may limit the number of stand-
ards proper, due regard being had to the character of the pictures and the
purpose for which they are to be used, otherwise the trial of a questioned
document might occasionally resolve itself into a veritable picture show and
be greatly and unnecessarily prolonged.
64 Wade v. Galveston R. Co., (Tex. Civ. App. 1908) 110 S. W. 84; Aiken Inc. v.
Sparks, (Tex. Civ. App. 1933) 56 S.W. (2d) 279.
6- Spottswood v. Wier, 66 Cal. 525, 6 Pac. 381 (1885) ; Commonwealth v. East-
man, 1 Cush. 189, 217, 48 Am. Dec. 596 (Mass. 1848) ; Cohen v. Teller, 93 Pa.
123 (18803.
66Howard v. Russell, 75 Tex. 171, 12 S. W. 525 (1889). Freehand drawings,
whether on paper or a blackboard, made by an expert in the presence of the
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An honest and competent specialist will refuse to give a definite
opinion as to a questioned writing until he has carefully examined and
compared it with a sufficient amount of appropriate standard material,
in spite of the fact that interested parties or their counsel are often
urgent for an immediate and definite opinion notwithstanding. There
are also cases in which a document question is unexpectedly raised so
near to the time of trial that the securing of adequate and proper
standards is impossible, or the question sometimes may arise during
the hearing,66a but the cases are much more numerous in which the
employment of a specialist and the securing of proper standards is
delayed or omitted through the negligence, or even the ignorance of
parties or their counsel as to the necessity of standards and proper
time and opportunity to examine them and to prepare for effective
presentation of the essential facts in court, including the making of
such photographs as may be necessary or useful for that purpose.
Statutes in a few states require submission of standards to the opposite
party before trial in order to make them admissible in evidence.6 7
Primarily it is the duty of counsel and his assistants rather than the
expert to procure proper standards of comparison, but the early sub-
mission of a document problem to the specialist will often elicit from
him valuable suggestions as to the character and amount of standard
writing requisite to a proper investigation, determination and presenta-
tion of the facts, or even to suggestions as to the specific sources from
which such material may be obtained.6 8 Counsel, however, once the
requirements of the case are clearly known, may usually be trusted to
jury are not improper, however, when used as a means of illustrating or
demonstrating his testimony as to writings properly in evidence. Wolf v.
People's Bank, 255 Il. App. 127 (1924) ; Spencer, supra note 2 at 147, n. 57.
66a See Land Finance Corp. v. Menzies, 114 Conn. 694, 160 AtI. 168 (1932), hold-
ing that alleged insufficiency of time and opportunity for examination and
comparison does not render experts' testimony inadmissible.
67 See statutes in Georgia and Kentucky. These statutes seem wise and fair,
and calculated on the whole to promote the ends of justice and the dispatch
of business in the courts by preventing the unfair selection of standards dis-
cussed in the earlier cases excluding extrinsic standards, though they may
sometimes prove embarrassing in practice. There are, however, in all states
statutes as to discovery and inspection of documents. In this connection see
the Wisconsin Statutes (1935), Section 327.21 and WIGMORE, EVIDENCE, (2d
ed. 1923) §§1858, 1859 and 18 C. J. 116, as to production and inspection of
writings and other matters generally. As to subpoena duces tecum see supra
note 24.
6SSee the possible sources of standards listed in OsBORN, PROBLEM OF PROOF, pp.
342,343. In one case we found the signatures of two attorneys both of whom
were dead, on the signed roll of attorneys in the local circuit court. They were
witnesses to a will. In this connection see the rather interesting cage of
Hawkinson v. Oatway, 143 Wis. 136, 126 N. W. 683 (1910). In another case
many excellent standards were supplied from the vaults of a bank, where the
testator had a safe deposit box. In an anonymous letter case, two pages of
original entries in a day book clearly established the authorship of these
letters.
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obtain directly or through his agents, the requisite material if it can
be found.
The subject of request writings as standards, including writings by
those accused or in custody, has been briefly noticed.69 The entire
field of request writings has in our opinion been quite ably covered in
Mr. Osborn's books"0 and are we not inclined to rediscuss the prob-
lems involved. The questioned writing, however, should not be given
to the request-writer to copy, but the test matter should be dictated,
or else typed. If possible, the party should be required to write at
intervals or even at separate sittings and each separate writing should
be taken away as soon as it is complete. The surroundings and treat-
ment of the writer should, so far as possible, be such as to put him
at his ease. The matter to be written need not, and often should not,
be the very matter of the questioned writing but if possible should
contain all the written characters, including figures, embraced in the
questioned document. Such writings however, should, if possible, be
so framed as to bring out any such peculiarities of spelling and punc-
tuation as are found in the questioned writing, and its peculiarities of
arrangement. The writing time of the several specimens should be
varied, if possible, especially in anonymous letter cases.
It has been suggested that arrested persons who might otherwise
be disinclined to write may sometimes be induced to do so by being
asked to make and sign a list or inventory of their personal effects
taken in charge by the police. With ordinary and inexperienced offend-
ers this plan may often succeed in securing a reliable standard, but
with the seasoned forger who has long resided on Queer Street or up
Crooked Lane, there is more doubt whether writing, even if thus
secured, would have much evidential value. Though handwriting rec-
ords in police files sometimes help to fix responsibility for crime even
in the case of experienced criminals, the records and files of penal
institutions should not be overlooked where the suspected party, as
is often the case, has a prison record.
While standards of comparison obtained under a void or illegal
search warrant have been held indamissible against a party charged
with crime,71 the fact that evidence has been wrongfully obtained by
other means has quite generally been held not to render it inadmis-
sible, provided it is otherwise competent.7 2 Courts, however, frown
69 See the cases cited in note 46, supra.
70 OSBORN, PROBLEM OF PROOF 344; OSBORN, QUESTIONED DOCUMENTS (2d ed.)
32, 34, 423.
71 See also People v. Bain, 359 Ill. 455, 195 N. E. 42 (1935).
72 See 16 C. J. 570.
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upon the employment of strong-arm, fraudulent or other questionable
or devious means of obtaining evidence, and such evidence seldom
finds favor with juries.
Without considering what legally constitutes forgery or the utter-
ing of a forged instrument, it must suffice to say that in spite of all
penalties against forgery, however severe,7 3 forgery is and long has
been a common and rather profitable offense which, supported by per-
jury, as is often the case, not infrequently defies detection or proof.7 4
Statistics as to the number of forgeries committed or the losses to indi-
viduals or the public caused thereby are necessarily quite meagre and
incomplete.7 5
Various devices and expedients have been suggested and adopted
as safeguards against forgery by alteration and substitution with many
of which lawyers, conveyancers and others similarly employed should
be familiar as part of their professional or special training.76 Few rules
of law, however, require those who prepare or execute written instru-
ments to use safeguards or precautions for the protection of others
against alteration or spoliation. It is held in some states, however,
73 By statute in England forgery 4las for many years a capital offense. As late
as 1777 a clergyman, Dr. Dodd, was hanged at Tyburn for the forgery of a
bond for some 4000 pounds. See BIRKENHEAD, FAmOUs TRIALs oF HISTORY,
151. While forging and uttering are still technically felonies in most states,
the penalities therefor are now comparatively mild, and probation rather than
prison may in many states be granted at least to first offenders. This is true
in Wisconsin. The forgery cases definitely before the trial court in Milwaukee
are about one hundred each year. The great majority of the defendants plead
guilty.
74 Many of the most important cases of this kind involve wills "sworn through"
by attesting witnesses. Some notable attempts of this kind, however, have
failed in the face of expert and other testimony showing almost if not quite
conclusively the fact of forgery. See Buthnalt v. Christy, 201 Iova 955, 208
N. W. 218 (1926), where the will of a blind woman was finally disallowed
on the third appeal. Her signature was rather accurately retouched and over-
written where the ink failed to give down. How did she know that the ink had
failed, and how could she have retouched it or overwritten it, if she did
know? See also ln re O'Connor's Estate, 105 Neb. 88, 179 N. W. 401 (1920);
Baird v. Shaffer, 101 Kan. 585, 168 Pac. 836 (1917); In re Burtis' Will, 43
Misc. 437, 89 N. Y. Supp. 441 (1904).
75 See the report of the Wickersham Commission of the Cost of Crime, June
1931, pages 403, 104. The estimate of $40,000,000 annually seems very conserva-
tive, particularly in view of the fact that many forgeries are never discovered
or are never exposed and hence do not find their way into statistics of any
kind. Many cases involving actual forgery are simply "settled," not to say
compounded, at least occasionally. The annual loss to banks through forgery
has been estimated at from $600,000 to $800,000, some of it through altered
or "raised" paper, but largely by means of forged signatures.
76 See OSBORN, QUESTIONED DOCUMENTS (2d ed.) 663 and cc. 25 and 26, as to the
physical preparation and the execution of documents for many valuable sug-
gestions with the soundness of which intelligent and experienced readers must
quite generally agree. We cannot fully agree, however, with his view that it is
usually bad practise for a lawyer who prepares a will and supervises its execu-
tion to sign it as an attesting witness. See In re Carpenter's Will, 145 N. Y.
Supp. 365 (1913) ; McMaster v. Scriven, 85 Wis. 162, 55 N. W. 149 (1893);
Adams v. Rodnan, 102 Wis. 456, 78 N. W. 588 (1889).
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though denied in others, that one who makes, draws, accepts or in-
dorses a negotiable instrument with blank and uncancelled spaces so
negligently left thereon as to facilitate or invite alteration is liable to
a subsequent holder thereof in due course for the full abount of the
instrument in its altered form.
7 7
Without going much further into this important subject, it is sug-
gested that the practice of drawing wills and other important documents
in several loose or detached sheets or upon sheets insecurely fastened
together at the time of execution is especially dangerous and open to
criticism.73 Generally no erasures, alterations or additions or interlinea-
tions should be made or permitted on any important document where
this can be avoided unless they are of such nature as to be clearly
immaterial. In other cases the facts as to the change or addition should
be carefully noted in the document before the attesting clause, or in a
separate memorandum thereon signed by the parties and their witnesses
to the effect that it was made before the instrument was executed. 79
77 See SPENCER, CYCLOPEDIA OF Bus. LAW, §§580, 581. See also 7 C.J. 684 as to the
duty of the depositor to his bank to use due care to so draw his checks as
not to facilitate or invite alteration. No case, however, goes so far as to hold
that the use of safety paper, protectographs or similar devices is necessary to
escape liability for the negligent drawing of a negotiable instrument. The
use of a pencil in writing any part of such an instrument is of course to be
condemned. See Harvey v. Smith 55 Ill. 224 (1870), where a condition written
in pencil was wholly erased from a pen-written promissory note and an inno-
cent holder was held to take it free from the defense of alteration.
78 See OSBORN, QUESTIONED DOCUMENTS (2d. ed.) 667, 668; see 68 C. J. 983, nn.
64 to 66, as to wills, composed of two or more sheets. See also In re Swains
Will, 162 N. C. 213, 78 S. E. 72 (1913) ; Sellards v. Kirby, 82 Kan. 291, 108
Pac. 73 (1910). The use of cheap and inadequate fasteners permitting a docu-
ment to be taken apart without leaving any evidence of tampering is of course
extremely bad practice and can be easily avoided.
79 For the almost hopelessly conflicting decisions involving the presumptions as
to the time when alterations were made see 3 JONES EVIDENCE (Hor. ed.)
§§188, 189. See also 2 C. J. 1273; 3 WILLISTON, CONTRACTS §1916, 1917; Note
(1925) 44 A.L.R. 1244.
In Wisconsin it is presumed, in accordance with the prevailing rule, that
an alteration was made before execution unless the circumstances are sus-
picious, as where it appears to be in a different hand or ink than the rest of
the document. See Maldaner v. Smith, 102 Wis. 30, 36, 78 N. W. 140 (1899) ;
Bradley v. Lirniber Co., 105 Wis. 245, 81 N. W. 394 (1900). The burden of
showing the existence of alterations not apparent on the face of the instrument
is upon the party alleging them. See JONES, EVIDENCE (Hor. ed.) §564, n. 46.
For the presumption as to wills see Martin v. Martin, 334 Ill. 115, 165 N. E.
644, 67 A. L. R. 1127 (1929).
